# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING SCIENCES& MANAGEMENT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM BASED ON DB SCAN AND SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE

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## ABSTRACT

In this paper, we will discuss about the intrusion detection system their effects and also discuss about the existing algorithms like clustering algorithms such as K means their drawbacks and effects. We will also discuss one more algorithm called DBSCAN (Density based scanning algorithm). We have compared this algorithm with the existing algorithm and present the summary also.

Keywords- DBSCAN, clustering, K-means, f-measure, efficiency.

# I. INTRODUCTION

We first employ a clustering algorithm to partition a raining data set that consists of labeled flows combined with unlabeled flows. Clustering of data is a method by which large sets of data are grouped into clusters of smaller ets of similar data. A K-Means clustering algorithm attempts to find natural groups of components (or data) based on some similarities. The K-Means clustering algorithm also finds the centroid of a group of data sets. The k-means algorithm used in this work is one of the most non-hierarchical methods used for data clustering.

After clustering of training data, we use the available labeled flows to obtain a mapping from the clusters to the different known classes. The result of the learning is a set of clusters, some mapped to the different flow types. This method, referred to as semi-supervised learning. The input data for classification task is collection of number of records. Each record, also known as an instance, is characterized by a tuple (x, y), where x is the attribute set and y is class attribute. Let  $X = \{X_1...X_N\}$  be a set of flows. A flow instance  $X_i$  is characterized by a vector of attribute values,  $X_i = \{X_{ij} | 1 \le j \le m\}$ , where m is the number of attributes, and  $X_{ij}$  is the value of the j<sup>th</sup> attribute of the i<sup>th</sup> flow. Also, let  $Y = \{Y_1...Y_q\}$  be the set of traffic classes, where q is the number of classes of interest. The Yi's can be classes. Our goal is to learn a mapping from an m-dimensional variable X to Y. This mapping forms the basis for classification models. This way the trained system is formed and it is then tested. In testing stage, after the training phase is over next is to test it on out-of-sample data. The testing phase is basically depends on the result parameters of training phase. In testing phase minimum distance of each record from cluster center obtained from the training phase is compared, If found the data is assigned the same cluster. But, there are certain problems related with K-means clustering. These are as follows:

- Difficulty in comparing quality of the clusters produced (e.g. for different initial partitions or values of K affect outcome).
- Fixed number of clusters can make it difficult to predict what K should be.
- Does not work well with non-globular clusters.
- Different initial partitions can result in different final clusters. It is helpful to rerun the program using the same as well as different K values, to compare the results achieved.

# **II. PROBLEM STATEMENT**

There have many classifiers to find the intrusion, such as Clustering classifier, neural network classifier, Bayesian classifier and SVM classifier. It has been observed that to select correct classifier is a tough work. Although many IDS has been developed many years ago, but it generate large amount of alert messages which makes the maintenance of system inefficient. Most of the presented IDs make use of all the features in the packet to analyze and look for well - known intrusive model. Some of these features are irrelevant and redundant. Existing approaches have the following drawbacks.

- Lengthy training and testing process,
- Low accuracy rate,
- High false positive rate,
- Low detection rate and
- Occupy more storage space.

Apart from these K-Means clustering have the many drawbacks like the clusters are of differing sizes, densities and non globular shapes. It also has the problems with outliers and it generates empty clusters.

Proposed approach finds out the problems and removed the drawbacks of existing approaches. DB SCAN is one of the promising algorithms for intrusion detection system.

In the proposed approach, we have used Support Vector Machine as a classifier.

#### **III. PROPOSED APPROACH**

In previous chapter, the most regularly used intrusion detection techniques are described. Existing techniques are used the Clustering classifier, neural network classifier and Bayesian classifier. These approaches have the problem of over-fitting. SVM classifier removes the problem of over-fitting, but it uses the all features or maximum features of dataset to find the accuracy rate, so there are increases the problem of data redundancy and it consumes more computer recourses. To remove the drawbacks of existing approaches, DBSSVM approach is proposed. In this proposed approach, Intrusion Detection System is implemented by using Rough Set Theory and Support Vector Machine technique. RST is used for feature selection, and SVM is used as classifier in this system.

In this work, accuracy rate, false positive rate and attack detection rate of intrusion detection using rough set theory and support vector machine are tried to find out. Since SVM classifier supports only numeric data, so in the proposed approach, firstly we have to convert the text features in numeric data, then we get the small size dataset by reducing the redundant data. Finally, selected features are passed to the SVM to get the accuracy rate, false positive rate and attack detection rate of dataset. The proposed algorithm has following steps.

- Data Preprocessing.
- DB SCAN Algorithm.
- Intrusion SVM Classification

### IV. ARCHITECTURE OF PROPOSED APPROACH

Intrusion detection is a method for finding various intrusions. But here we are trying to find their behavior. As there are various factors on which we can evaluate the exact behavior of an intruder. But in earlier researches, some factors give same type of information or we can say that redundant information is obtained. So this becomes a very tedious job to rectify such redundant information. It took more space in computer memory.

Intrusion detection is a critical component of secure information systems. Since elimination of the insignificant and/or useless inputs leads to a simplification of the problem, faster and more accurate detection may result. DB SCAN, therefore, is an important issue in intrusion detection.

So, to overcome from such type of redundancy and to identify the important features, an approach is proposed and implemented in this dissertation. By using DB SCAN algorithm, we are able to minimize the 41 features of KDD CUP'99 dataset into 6 features. These selected 6 features are non-redundant and give focused information. So this is a step towards more accuracy. Then support vector machine tool is used to classify the data, and find the accuracy of detection. Proposed method follows the necessary steps required to perform in Intrusion Detection System. These steps are Data Preparation, Data Preprocessing, Feature Selection, and Classification. The flow chart of proposed DBSSVM approach for Intrusion Detection is illustrated in Figure 4.1



#### Proposed DBSSVM Approach for ID

Since standard (benchmark) dataset for intrusion detection is available so there is no need to prepare the dataset. KDD CUP'99 dataset is used as a database to test the system performance, which is the dataset used for the third

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international knowledge discovery and data mining tools competition, which was held in conjunction with KDD CUP'99, the fifth international conference of knowledge discovery and data mining.

For selecting features from each sample, rough set theory has been adopted. These selected features corresponding to each instance proceed for classification.

As a classification technique, SVM is chosen because it already provided a better accuracy than other techniques for intrusion detection.

## V. DATASET DESCRIPTION

Since 1999, KDD'99 has been the most wildly used data set for the evaluation of anomaly detection methods. The database is gathered from The Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, which was held in conjunction with KDD-99, The Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. KDD training dataset consists of approximately 4,900,000 single connection vectors each of which contains 41 features and is labeled as either normal or an attack, with exactly one specific attack type. The simulated attacks fall in one of the following four categories.

- **Denial of Service Attack (DoS):** DoS is an attack in which the attacker makes some computing or memory resource too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests, or denies legitimate users access to a machine.
- User to Root Attack (U2R): U2R is a class of exploit in which the attacker starts out with access to a normal user account on the system (perhaps gained by sniffing passwords, a dictionary attack, or social engineering) and is able to exploit some vulnerability to gain root access to the system.
- **Remote to Local Attack (R2L):** R2L occurs when an attacker who has the ability to send packets to a machine over a network but who does not have an account on that machine exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as a user of that machine.
- Probing Attack: Probe is an attempt to gather information about a network of computers for the apparent purpose of circumventing its security controls.

Attack Type	Attack Category	Attack Type	Attack Category			
ftp_write		apache2				
guess_passwd		Back				
Imap		Land				
Multihop		Mailbomb				
Named		Neptune	Dos			
Phf		Pod				
Sendmail		Processtable				
Snmpgetattack	R2L	Smurf				
Snmpguess		Teardrop				
Spy		Udpstrom				
Warezclient		Normal	Normal			
Warezmaster		buffer_overflow				
Worm		Httptunnel				
Xlock		Loadmodule				
Xsnoop		Perl				
Ipsweep		Ps	U2K			
Mscan		Rootkit				
Nmap	Droha	Sqlattack				
Portsweep	riobe	Xtern				
Satan						
Saint						

Table 4.1: Attack types and their respective classes

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6: 9852.25.25.42.82.25.29.27.29.57.55.57.57.82.82.82.82.82.82.85.85.85.92.95.85.85	3268:826
8: G8FT821vare.=F.los.l40.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0	20.0.00.
0. normal.	
8.995.55374.565.55.565.5465.249.242.2.865.554.8.865.658.868.8.867.678	3268:826
8: 338P8F193785.5F. 105.146.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0	20.0.00.
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Figure 4.2: The original data of KDD CUP'99

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#### A. DATA PREPROCESSING

The information obtained by KDD Cup'99 is a combination of many system calls. A system call is a text base record. Every system call in the dataset has 41 features as listed in table 4.2. There are several text words in the dataset. Since SVM is used only numerical data for testing and training, so text features are needed to be converted into numerical values. The features, as shown in figure 4.1, contain the text value are protocol\_type, flag, and service. Therefore, I have assumed some numerical values for different text features, like 'protocol\_type' feature 'tcp' as 3, 'udp' as 7, and 'icmp' as 9 etc. To translating the Text data to numeric data in KDD cup'99 Data Set is given in table 4.2.

Туре	Class	No.	Туре	Class	No.
Attack/Normal	Attack	1		imap4	23
	Normal	0		iso_tsap	24
	ТСР	3		Klogin	25
Protocol Type	UDP	7		Kshell	26
	ICMP	9		Ldap	27
	OTH	1		Link	28
	REJ	2		Login	29
	RSTO	3	Service	Mtp	30
	RST080	4	Service	Name	31
	KSIK S0	5		netbios_dgm	32
Flag	<u> </u>	0		netbios_ns	24
	<u> </u>	8		Netstat	34
	<u> </u>	9		Nnsn	36
	SF	10		nntn	37
		intp	37		
	SH	11		telnet	38
	Auth	1		Time	39
	Bgp	2		Uucp	40
	Courier	3		uucp_path	41
	csnet_ns	4		Vmnet	42
	Ctf	5		Whois	43
	Daytime	6		Z39_50	44
	Discard	7		ntp_u	45
	Domain	8		Other	46
	domain_u	9		pop_2	47
	Echo	10		pop_3	48
Service	eco_i	11		Printer	49
Service	ecr_i	12		Private	50
	Efs	13		remote_job	51
	Exec	14		Rje	52
	Finger	15		Shell	53
	ftp	16		Smtp	54
	ftp_data	17		sql_net	55
	Gopher	18		Ssh	56
	Hostnames	19		Sunrpc	57
	http	20		Supdup	58
	http_443	21		Systat	59
	IRC	22		X11	60

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After transformation of text values to numeric value, the dataset is obtained in following format. Features of KDD CUP'99 and behavior of intruder is shown in figure 4.3.

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з	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
5	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
7	0	7	9	10	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
8	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
9	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
10	0	3	20	10	223	185	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
12	0	з	20	10	230	260	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
13	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
14	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
15	1	з	54	10	3170	329	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
16	0	з	20	10	297	13787	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
17	0	Э	20	10	291	3542	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
18	0	з	20	10	295	753	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
19	0	7	50	10	105	146	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
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5	0	2 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	254	1.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	
6	0	2 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	255	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	
7	0	0 2	2 1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	1.00	0.00	10	з	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
8	0	0 1	. 1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	253	0.99	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
9	0	2 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	254	1.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	
10	0	0 <	4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	71	255	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
11	0	0 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	254	1.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	
12	0	0 1	19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.11	3	255	1.00	0.00	0.33	0.07	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
13	0	0 0	. 1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	254	1.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
14	0	2 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	252	0.99	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	
15	0	0 1	2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	54	39	0.72	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.09	0.13	normal.	
16	0	2 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	177	255	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
17	0	1 1 2	12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	187	255	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
18	0	2:	22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.09	196	255	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	normal.	
19	0	2 2	2 2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	254	1.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	
20	0	2 1	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	255	254	1.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	snmpgetattack.	~
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Figure 4.3: 41 Features and behavior of Intruder

# VI. RESULT ANALYSIS

-	Fig	ure 1: Resu	IIt:Accurac	y		
File	E	dit View In	sert Tools	Desktop	Window	v Help 🔊
						Bar Chart of Accuracy
		Class Name	Accuracy (	%)	100	
	1	NORMAL	98.57	50		
	2	DOS	97.65	500	80 -	
	з	U2R		98		
	4	R2I	96.25	500	60 -	
	5	PROBE	98.47	50		
					40 -	
					20 -	
					0	NORMAL DOS U2R R2L PROBE
2						

Figure 5.1 Analysis of Accuracy Rate

## PRECISION



Figure 5.2: Analysis of precision

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# RECALL

Figure 5.3: Analysis of Recall

## **F-MEASURE**



# Figure 5.4: Analysis of F-Measure



# Figure 5.5: Confusion Matrix

# CLUSTERING RESULT

Callecord :	4200		Cluster No.	Total Cluster member	⊂lass		
	4200	1	1	929	DOS	~	
beled Record :	0.10	2	2	33	NORMAL		
	840	3	3	26	R2L		
		4	4	9	R2L		
abeled Record :	3360	5	5	96	R2L		
		6	6	35	R2L		
tal Clusters :	18	7	7	43	DOS		
		0	8	9	DOS		
ne Taken (sec. ):	06 61 01	9	9	22	22 DOS		
	00.0181	10	10	33	PROBE		
		11	11	9	U2R	~	

# Figure 5.6: Clustering Result

## **RESULT FOR KDD DATA SET**

Attack Type	Accuracy Rate	Precision	Recall	F measure
Normal	98.5750	100	86.1314	91.2596
Dos	97.6500	99.1162	90.0229	93.1055
U2R	98	57.2973	99.0654	68.1672
R21	96.2500	94.7602	99.1565	96.2787
Probe	98.4750	97.3404	76.5690	83.2579

# TABLE 4.4 CLUSTERING RESULT FOR KDD CUP DATA SET

Training	No. of	Labeled	Unlabeled	No. of	Time Taken
Data Set	Features	Samples	Samples	Clusters	(Sec)
4200	41	840	3360	18	86.5181

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

The aim of the project is to design and implement a semi-supervised learning approach for network traffic classification and it has been achieved successfully. A DB SCAN approach to design a Network Traffic Classifiers is implemented successfully. Algorithm permits both labeled and unlabeled data to be used in training the network. While performing training and testing of the classifier for a dataset, it is observed that a test error rate depends on the number of clusters which is randomly used in training phase. We have used the KDD Data Set as a training data set and improved the accuracy rate of the semi supervised algorithm.

Proposed algorithm is very apt and reliable for finding the supervised and unsupervised data. The algorithm has been proved that in the future Of course, we can improve accuracy rate, false positive rate and attack detection rate of intrusion detection by providing the some improved form of the DB SCAN algorithm.

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